Prior research has concluded that governments provide greater private benefits to betterinformed individuals. This paper shows, for the first time, that governments may, instead, exploit informed individuals' greater willingness to pay for these benefits by charging more for them. The government of Benin combats malaria with programs to distribute free bed nets. Using a "natural experiment" in radio markets in northern Benin, the paper finds that households with greater media access were more likely to pay for these bed nets. We show that these households were more exposed to radio programming on the benefits of bed nets and the hazards of malaria. Local government officials, who exercise significant discretion over bed net pricing, responded to the higher demand of these households by selling bed nets that they could have distributed for free. Mass media therefore appear to have changed the private behavior of citizens-in this case, to invest more of their own resources in a public health good (bed nets)-but not citizens' ability to extract greater benefits from government.
Introduction
Citizens who are more informed about the benefits of public policies could use this knowledge to demand greater benefits from government. However, if better informed citizens have a greater willingness to pay for benefits, government officials could also charge them fees for benefits that less informed citizens receive for free. Researchers have focused on the first effect of information, presenting evidence that citizens with greater access to mass media, a principal source of information about public policies, are more likely to receive cash transfers (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Strömberg 2004) . This paper investigates the effects of media on a policy that provides noncash benefits, the distribution of anti-malaria bed nets in Africa, where both channels are relevant. We find significant evidence that government agents respond to more informed households by exploiting their greater willingness to pay, rather than by providing greater benefits. The evidence comes from Benin, a country with a large donor-supported program for the distribution of free bed nets, and one that offers a "natural experiment" in media access. There, local government officials, who are responsible for distributing free bed nets, are more likely to charge a fee for bed nets in areas where households have greater media access. Media access has no effect on the total number of bed nets reported by households and, in some settings, a negative effect on the number of free bed nets that they report.
The distribution of free or highly subsidized anti-mosquito bed nets plays a central role in malaria prevention programs in Africa. Free distribution, specifically, has been endorsed by donors (e.g., the World Bank, WHO, and Population Services International) and policy researchers (e.g., the Poverty Action Lab, see http://www.povertyactionlab.org/scale-ups/free-insecticidal-bednets), who view bed nets as an essential public health good, but one that exhibits high price elasticity (Cohen and Dupas, 2008) . Malaria prevention programs also broadcast public health messages about the value of bed nets, using mass media that are widely accessible to the poor. Benin is typical of this pattern: donor-funded government programs to distribute bed nets are a central focus of antimalaria campaigns, and donors and government finance radio broadcasts of public health messages related to bed nets.
Greater radio access increases household exposure to information about the benefits of malaria prevention and about government provision of a valuable health commodity, anti-malaria bed nets. This exposure potentially increase household demand for the nets. Local government agents responsible for distributing bed nets can respond to more demanding households by supplying more bed nets, but also by charging higher prices. To the extent that better-informed citizens are able to exert pressure on government agents to extract greater benefits, the number of bed nets they receive should increase. However, if the accountability channel is weak, local officials who are in a position to observe higher demand, can exercise their de facto discretion to respond to increased demand by raising prices. In this case, more informed households would be more likely to pay for bed nets rather than to receive them for free. Unique survey data on household bed nets acquisition in northern Benin, a region that provides experimental variation to identify media effects, allows us to distinguish how government agents respond to more informed citizens. We find that the second channel prevails.
The data come from a survey of 4200 households in Benin undertaken in March 2009, after a massive expansion of free bed net distribution by the government. We asked detailed questions about the mode of acquisition of each bed net currently in the possession of the householdwhether it was acquired from the government, private market sellers, charitable organizations, friends or family, and whether households paid for it. Households were sampled from villages in northern Benin that exhibit substantial variation in access to a particular type of media, community radio, which broadcasts detailed programming on the value of public health, in general, and malaria prevention, in particular.
Characteristics of the community radio market in this region permit the identification of the reduced-form effects of media access on bed net acquisition by households. Twenty-one small, private, non-commercial or community radio stations, each with limited signal strength, serve the region, in addition to the ubiquitous national public radio station. They are organized at the commune level, the relevant local administrative jurisdiction in Benin at which bed net distribution is managed. Cross-commune differences in radio access are likely to be driven by commune-specific characteristics that also influence health services in communes. However, we control for commune fixed effects and focus on the variation in community radio access across villages within a commune.
Intra-commune variation in community radio access is exogenous to village-specific characteristics. It does not arise because some villages in a commune are targeted by community radios and others are not. Instead, accidental features, such as small changes in terrain and distance within a commune, incidentally affect the range of multiple radio signals from low-powered community broadcasters. Though these features have large effects on the number of community radio stations that a village can access, they are too insignificant to have an independent effect on the households' access to government programs. Even randomly selected villages located close to each other, and sharing the same geographic and topographical features, can differ significantly in the number of community radio signals reaching them. To further exploit these radio market conditions, we sampled our villages to match each other on observable geographic characteristics, namely in distance to major roads and to radio station headquarters.
The findings we report have several implications. First, they identify a potentially costeffective approach to improving the take-up of government health benefits. Recent research has demonstrated that information can have a significant positive effect on health and education outcomes. However, it has focused on relatively intensive interventions to convey information and advocacy messages (multi-member team visits to villages, as in Banerjee et al., 2010, or - in an intervention that included both information and community organization -Bjorkmann and Svensson, forthcoming). Community radio broadcasts may offer a potentially cheaper, more scalable and sustainable approach to transmitting information, since our results show that these broadcasts significantly increase households' willingness to pay for mosquito bed nets.
Second, the results shed light on the mechanisms through which media access operates. Most importantly, we are able to use the detailed bed net module in the survey to identify a new mechanism through which media effects operate: local government officials observe the mediainduced higher demand for bed nets and, in a context where weak administrative controls allow them to depart from centrally-set guidelines that call for free distribution, adjust prices upwards. This conclusion is supported not only by reduced form estimates showing that households with greater media access are more likely to own purchased government bed nets, but by evidence that radio access is associated with greater household knowledge of information relevant to household demand for health.
On the other hand, media access does not enable citizens to claim more free bed nets. Other features of the institutional environment in Benin help to explain why. Political economy analyses of Benin have emphasized the importance of clientelist networks in determining who gets greater benefits from government (e.g., Wantchekon, 2003) . This blunts the role that information typically plays in more competitive and mature democracies.
Third, our results identify new effects of information when officials are vulnerable to "local capture." Reinikka and Svensson (2004) characterize as evidence of local capture the decision of local officials in Uganda not to follow centrally-set rules. They show that local capture is less likely in more informed communities. The parallel definition of local capture in the policy context here is the decision of local officials sell bed nets that donors and central government prefer be given away for free (USAID, 2011) . Local capture, in this setting, is more likely in villages with greater media access. The distinct outcomes may be due to differences in the degree to which media broadcasts increase household demand for a government service, by focusing on the value of public health practices, and less on government responsibilities to deliver services; and in the ability of households to use information to pressure government for more benefits.
Finally, then, these results have important implications for the new thrust in international aid to use information and transparency to promote government accountability in difficult political economy environments (Zoellick 2011) . The results here indicate that, in contrast to previous research in more mature democracies, the media dissemination of general policy information (e.g., on the availability of a government benefit) is not, by itself, sufficient to enable citizens in less developed democracies to demand greater benefits from government. Instead, information can have important development effects by changing private household behavior. This, of course, leaves open the question of how to use transparency initiatives to improve government behavior.
The next section situates our findings in two strands of the literature, one on media effects and another on the determinants of bed net take-up by households. Section 3 describes elements of bed net distribution and the media market in Benin that are essential to understanding our empirical strategy. A discussion of that strategy -the identification of media effects -follows next in Section 4. The empirical results are then presented in Section 5. Our main results show significant effects of media access on the pricing of bed nets. We also present evidence on mechanisms and the effects of radio access on household knowledge. The main results are robust to numerous alternative specifications. The conclusion in Section 6 highlights the implications of this work for efforts to improve governance in poor countries through increased transparency.
Literature Review
Prior research has found that individual households or narrow geographic jurisdictions with greater media access are more likely to receive targeted benefits from government programs. Citizens with greater media access are more informed about these programs and more likely to participate in political actions to hold government accountable for the delivery of these benefits. Anticipating this, governments target greater benefits to citizens with greater media access (e.g., Burgess 2002, Strömberg 2004, Snyder and Strömberg, forthcoming) . We find that, in a different policy context and institutional setting, governments respond to more informed citizens not by giving them greater benefits, but instead, by exploiting these citizens' greater willingness to pay for benefits.
This prior research implicitly suggests that media effects arise because media raises awareness of transfer programs: whether a program exists, eligibility for the program, how one gains access to program benefits, when those benefits are available, and whether citizens can identify the government actors who are responsible for delivering the benefits. Our data allow us to confirm that all of this information is accessible in Benin and is broadcast on community radio stations. This is significant, since important areas of public policy are often not covered by the media. Reports of natural or economic disasters are more intrinsically interesting and attract a wider audience than analyses of the efficacy of government education or malaria policy (Drèze and Sen, 1990; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007; Khemani, 2007) . This is not a constraint in northern Benin, however, since a significant share of the programming of the sample radio stations is dedicated to health and education programming. In addition, malaria policies stand in contrast to public policies with complicated production functions, such as education, in which the contribution of government to final outcomes is difficult to discern. Compared to education, media can more easily inform citizens about the contribution of government to bed net availability and the effect of bed nets on malaria.
The results here are related to those in Keefer and Khemani (2010) , who use the same data from northern Benin and find that schools located in villages with greater radio access have no greater government-provided inputs (such as teachers or books), nor more responsive public agents (lower teacher absenteeism) nor more collective action (more active PTAs). In both the education study and this one, households with greater media access are more knowledgeable about information that can contribute to household demand for education and health services, and in both studies, households expend more of their own resources to purchase these services (textbooks for their children or, here, anti-malaria bed nets). There are several important differences between the two studies, however.
The most important is that, here, we are able to pin down a previously undocumented effect of media, showing that government officials respond to higher household demand by increasing the price of government-provided benefits. In addition, for two reasons, the policy setting here presents a more convincing test of media effects on citizen ability to demand greater benefits from government. First, there is a better match between the coverage area of the media we examine, community radios, and the location of government decision makers. Community radios target the commune in which they are located. The decisions about government inputs into local schools, however, are largely made in the capital city or at the departmental (supra-commune) level. In contrast, the pricing of government-provided bed nets is a local decision, made by health workers based in the commune. Second, mass media are likely to have a larger effect on government responsiveness in the implementation of a program that distributes tangible private benefits than one like education, where government's contribution to final outcomes is more difficult for households to discern.
Two considerations have emerged in recent literature that help to explain why we find that media access does not increase citizen access to free bed nets in Benin, while prior research has shown that media access increases access to cash transfers. First, recent research highlights the importance of "issue framing" in analyzing the impact of media-provided information on outcomes (Prat and Strömberg, 2011) . The analysis here provides an example of its potential importance. Community radio stations in Benin broadcast information that previous research has suggested is sufficient to increase government responsiveness, for example, by announcing the availability of government bed net distribution programs. Nevertheless, households' media access in Benin does not in fact translate into greater benefits from this program. Issue-framing may explain why.
Community radio programming emphasizes the health benefits of bed nets rather than the obligation of local officials to provide nets for free. Donors and international NGOs buy substantial air time on radio and are significant sponsors of health programs. They describe their malaria-related programming as intended to influence household health practices and to increase household valuation of public health goods through "social marketing". They do not describe programming content that emphasizes issues of local government accountability.
Second, and related, citizens may confront other obstacles to holding politicians accountable ("political market imperfections", as in Keefer and Khemani 2005) , that obstruct their efforts to demand better services or higher transfers even if they are well-informed about the policy. Khemani (2007) further suggests that the type of information required to surmount these other political market imperfections is not likely to be easily available from mass media in clientelist democracies such as Benin's (Wantchekon, 2003) . Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) argue that clientelist policies emerge when politicians cannot make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters at large. The political setting in Benin exhibits characteristics that weaken the capacity of citizens to act collectively to sanction non-performing incumbents, therefore undermining the credibility of pre-electoral political commitments. For example, in contrast to developed democracies, programmatic political parties that would facilitate citizen collective action are absent. The number of parties has fluctuated between 27 and 129 since competitive elections were first held in 1991. Over 100 tried to compete in the 2007 elections (Economist Intelligence Unit). None of the four major parties emerging from the 2007 elections had a programmatic identity -a basis for making credible commitments to large groups of citizens. Party fractionalization is correspondingly high: in 2006 the probability that two randomly selected legislators do not belong to the same party was 80 percent in Benin, compared to 52 percent in Ghana (Beck, et al. 2001) . Even those households with access to mass media should therefore find it difficult to participate in collective action to demand access to free bed nets.
The analysis here also contributes to the public health literature and research on the effects of pricing and media on the usage of bed nets, by showing a significant interaction between pricing and media strategies to encourage take-up. One body of research investigates the effects of pricing on whether households acquire bed nets and on how they allocate them once they acquire them. In a randomized experiment in Kenya, Cohen and Dupas (2008) show that uptake drops by sixty percentage points when the price is raised from 0 to $0.60 (about eighty percent of the prevailing price in Kenya). 1 This prior research abstracts from the impact of media campaigns aimed at increasing the demand for bed nets. Our results show that households with greater radio access and exposure to health-related programming are significantly more likely to own paid bed nets, suggesting a possible dampening effect on the price elasticity and allocation results reported in the literature.
Hoffman (2009) compares two randomly selected groups of maternal caregivers in Uganda. One group received cash and the opportunity to purchase bed nets and the other received free bed nets. Relative to all others in the household, net usage by the most vulnerable members, children five years and younger, was lower in the group that paid for bed nets.
Little research examines the effects of different communications strategies on bed net usage, specifically. Dupas (2009) finds that social marketing has no effect on price sensitivity. We find the opposite, looking at a different communications channel: households exposed to more community radio are more likely to have purchased bed nets.
A large communications literature shows that focused media programming can influence household behavior in public health and family planning, though these studies do not control for the endogeneity of radio access (Arnold and Lambino 2009 provide a review). Other work, which does address this endogeneity, does not examine effects on public health products, as in the analysis here. For example, Chong and La Ferrara (2009) report that expanding access to the broadcasts of soap operas in Brazil increased rates of divorce and separation; La Ferrara et al (2008) find that it reduced fertility. The potential adverse influence of radio access on household behavior, with tragic consequences, was recently quantified in Yanagizawa's (2009) work on the impact of "hate radio" in the Rwandan genocide.
Bed net distribution and media access in Benin
Benin is a small country in Francophone West Africa with a population of about 8,400,000. It is appropriate for the study of media effects on government responsiveness for several reasons. First, it is sufficiently democratic that results in prior research might suggest that media access would increase government responsiveness. 2 Both media and government services are organized by commune. Benin has 77 communes, ranging in population from under 40,000 to over 700,000. They are the electoral districts from which 83 members of the national assembly are elected through a system of party-list proportional representation. They are also the lowest tier of government, with each commune government consisting of a council of directly elected members who elect a mayor from among their ranks. Income per capita is approximately ten times greater in the richest compared to the poorest commune. Communes are the political jurisdiction around which both bed net distribution and the media (community radio) market is organized.
By the standards of the region, it has a relatively long (20 year) history of competitive elections and peaceful turnover of political power. It is also known for its vibrant network of local radio media. According to ratings of Reporters Without Borders from 2009, the year of our survey, Benin ranks 72 nd in the world, out of 175, in terms of freedom of the press, just behind Brazil (number 71), Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, Liberia and Togo, but substantially ahead of most other African countries.
Our analysis focuses on the the village level within communes. This is the relevant jurisdiction to examine how government agents respond to more informed households. The frontline government agents responsible for delivering bed nets to households are the health staff of village government clinics, who typically have close and direct interaction with households. This staff is locally-posted precisely to provide those public health goods and services demanded by local households, either by informing higher-level bureaucrats or by exercising their own discretion over the resources (including bed nets) available to them locally. The reduced-form results of the impact of community radio that we find are consistent with the local government health personnel responding to local changes in household demand by exercising their discretion to charge a higher price for bed nets.
The distribution of malaria nets in Benin
Malaria is endemic throughout Benin. Successive national malaria control programs have spent substantial resources on the distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets in the country, nearly always with the significant support of foreign donors. The United States President's Malaria Initiative was responsible for the majority of the nets distributed in 2009. 3 At the end of 2010, 4.7 million insecticide-treated nets were to be distributed, only 125,000 of which were financed directly from the government budget (USAID 2011, p. 19). 4 Project documents make clear that donors focus on free distribution, especially targeted to vulnerable populations of pregnant women and young children, and not on pricing strategies. Targets for USAID contractors, for example, never refer to cost recovery, emphasizing instead aggressive goals for the coverage of vulnerable populations. Government policy documents also emphasize free distribution because bed nets are classified as "essential" goods (USAID 2011, p. 14).
Nevertheless, as part of the general health financing policy of the government of Benin, local health officials are permitted to charge certain fees for health services under national guidelines and exemption policies (such as for indigent households, and for essential goods). Local health centers are entitled to retain any fees to finance the services they provide. However, because the government has little capacity to monitor adherence to guidelines and exemption policies, local officials can exercise significant discretion in the prices they charge and to whom they charge them. 5 In contrast to the control that local authorities exert over pricing, the quantity of bed nets allocated to a local health center is determined by the commune-level representatives of the central offices of the National Malaria Control Program. After donor-provided bed nets arrive in the port of Cotonou, the government, or NGOs contracted by donors or the government, distributes them to targeted areas. Donors or their contractors often monitor distribution down to the departmental level, but not from the department to more than 700 government health centers, nor from the health centers to households.
They may use these fees, in collaboration with community committees, to provide more services to citizens in their areas. Of course, they may also take advantage of weak financial controls to divert the fees to personal uses. The key point for the analysis here is that local health officials will be able to raise fees when demand is higher since they are embedded in communities, and as part of their routine service delivery responsibilities are privy to very local information about household demand for public health. That is, local government officials have both an incentive and the opportunity to charge for bed nets. 4 Donors and government also support the distribution of some bed nets through social marketing by the private sector, at heavily subsidized prices (USAID 2011, p.7 and p. 14), but this is a relatively small portion of the bed nets market. For example, only one major private organization directly distributes bed nets in Benin, the NGO, Population Services International (PSI). It reported selling 75,000 bed nets in 2009 4 , compared to 1,450,000 nets that were distributed by the government in 2007, and 800,000 in 2009, under the international Roll Back Malaria program (sponsored most notably by UNICEF, the World Health Organization and the World Bank).
health centers if they can persuade commune officials to respond to local information about household demand and increase allocations accordingly.
Anti-malaria campaigns also include communication efforts, including local radio programming (USAID 2011, p. 7). The evidence presented in the next section reflects this: community radio stations broadcast significantly more health and education information than other stations. This programming is intended to increase demand for and proper usage of bed nets, in part simply by alerting listeners to the imminent arrival of bed nets at local health centers.
We estimate the effect of radio access on how many bed nets households report, including how many they purchased and how many they received for free. A serious problem of inference would arise if anti-malaria media campaigns were focused on those areas targeted for paid bed nets and avoided areas where free bed nets were distributed. There are numerous reasons to conclude that this issue does not arise in the Benin context. First, policy documents indicate that donors and government exercise little real control over the pricing of bed nets, beyond issuing the general instruction of free distribution, everywhere. Second, even if they did, no documents that mention communications campaigns indicate that donors or governments modulate the campaigns according to their intended pricing strategies. On the contrary, the documents emphasize donor interest in both increasing demand for bed nets and promoting their correct usage: donors prefer to support programming wherever bed nets are distributed. For example, USAID, a major provider of both bed nets and communications programs, contracted with Population Services International to provide communications services. USAID emphasized in its request for proposal only the objective of increasing demand and proper usage, making no mention of pricing issues. 7 Both the success of these distribution programs in reaching far-flung households, and the ability of local officials to charge for bed nets, are evident in our sample. The analysis is based on our survey of 20 randomly selected households in each of 210 villages across northern Benin. These 4,200 households responded to a detailed bed net module.
Finally, third, evaluations of the anti-malaria campaign in Benin suggest that donors have difficulties coordinating the timing of their communications strategies, which would make coordination with pricing strategies even more difficult (Rwagacondo 2009 ).
There appears to be considerable scope to increase the supply of bed nets to ensure full coverage of all household members. The average household in our sample reports 0.38 bed nets for each household member, with even lower coverage of insecticide treated bed nets that are more effective against malaria, and are the focus of recent government distribution programs. Our work is therefore undertaken in a setting in which the government could respond by providing more bed nets, whether free or for a payment, to households that place a greater value on them. A supply response could be particularly important for malaria prevention given that old nets are likely to have lost their insecticide treatment and have reduced effectiveness against mosquitoes (Dupas, 2009) . Media access has no effect, however, on the total number of bed nets reported by households.
Media access in northern Benin
A key feature of media markets in northern Benin is the proliferation of community radios. These stations were established with the support of private and government donors to promote democracy and local collective action. Because of the paucity of commercial advertising, the stations have supported themselves with contracts from donors and government to broadcast public interest programming. For example, the international Roll Back Malaria program has used community radio to broadcast information about malaria control policies and advocacy for public health practices. Donor representatives and station managers confirm that they support programming that broadcasts general information about bed net availability and announcements regarding the timing of distribution, which is at the discretion of local health centers.
Community radio is also meant to influence the performance of such local institutions, either directly, when stations report on that performance, or indirectly, when stations sponsor call-in programs in which commune residents can discuss performance. Community radio access could therefore play a significant role in whether households acquire bed nets. Moreover, the same information that encourages households to take advantage of the bed net distribution programtelling households of the existence of the program, its eligibility requirements, and how to gain access to the program's benefits -also (potentially) promotes political accountability, since households can easily identify whether they received promised program benefits or not.
Our data include extensive information about community radio access and characteristics, including ownership, licensing, and programming, on all 68 radio stations operating in Benin as of March and April 2009. Table 1 summarizes some of this information. The national public radio station is essentially everywhere in northern Benin. In addition, though, the region is covered by a number of local community stations that are non-commercial by vocation, but also because there is no market for commercial advertising. These stations finance themselves by selling airtime to donors and government ministries. These sponsor programming to encourage households to make better decisions regarding health and education, including the acquisition and proper use of bed nets.
The southern region of Benin is more urbanized and densely settled. Most areas have access to multiple national and commercial radio stations and there is little within-commune variation in access across villages. Since our estimation focuses precisely on within-commune differences, we focus on the 32 northern communes of Benin. 9 9 Only the northern commune of Parakou is excluded; it is the second largest city of Benin, after the capital region of Cotonou in the south.
These exhibit substantial within-commune variation in radio access across villages that is exogenous to village-specific characteristics. Fourteen of the 21 community radio stations in the sample depend on funds from foreign donors and three on funds from non-governmental organizations. Regardless of funding source, all of them describe the provision of information on health and education as a "very important" objective. Consistent with this, the average number of health programs reported by station managers is large (138) and more than three times greater than for public or private commercial radio. Hence, access to a higher number of community radio stations is likely to be associated with exposure to more information about health issues.
To measure the number of radio stations to which households have access, enumerators first asked village-level key informants to list which radio stations they were able to receive. The enumerators also used their own transistor radios to verify and expand on this, if they received additional signals. We did not ask enumerators or village informants to describe the type of radio station or the nature of its programming. Instead, the radio codes from the village survey were matched with the radio survey data to examine the nature of programming available to the village.
Since community radio stations have low signal strength, no single station is accessible to more than a few villages in our sample. However, because the number of community broadcasters is large, 93 percent of our sampled villages receive at least one community signal. Private commercial radio reaches only a few villages in our sample (23 percent). Although private radio has greater signal strength, it is concentrated in the southern communes of Benin, outside our study area. In contrast, government-owned public radio has several relay transmitters that allow it to cover most of the villages in our sample (92 percent) with uniform programming. The information from religious stations is less reliable (for example, in the case of signal strength). However, only 13 respondents identified a religious station as their most preferred broadcaster.
The number of community radios to which villages have access ranges from zero to seven stations, averaging 2.4 and with a standard deviation of 1.5. All but 20 villages in the sample receive strong signals from one or more relayers of the national broadcaster and nearly all villages (175) have access to both a community radio station and national public radio. About 23 percent of villages have access to private commercial and 34 percent to religious radio stations.
Of the 3828 households that listen to some radio, 64 percent report listening to at least one community radio station and 45 percent report listening to national public radio. 10 listening to private commercial radio. 11 The observations drawn from the survey are not contaminated by noise from other mass media. Especially in the study area in northern Benin, radio is essentially the only media to which most citizens have access. Twenty-five percent of respondents to the nationally representative Afrobarometer (2005) survey of Benin report that their household owns a television. In the sample here, of 4200 households from northern Benin, only eight percent own a television, but 84 percent own radios; television ownership in this sample is uncorrelated with access to good radio signals. Newspapers also have little penetration. The largest has a circulation of 7,000, and that almost entirely in the capital city of Cotonou. Interviews with radio station staff indicate, however, that their news reports about Benin are often prepared based on reports from the Cotonou newspapers.
These preferences are consistent with availability (few households have access to private commercial radio) and with claims of broadcast media experts that the programming of national broadcasters conforms less well to the tastes and linguistic preferences of poor households in rural Africa compared to local radio stations (Buckley et al, 2008) .
Identification-The "natural experiment" in northern Benin
As in all work on media effects, the analysis here confronts the possibility that unobserved factors influence both media access and outcomes of interest, such as whether households have received bed nets from the government and whether they have paid for those nets or received them for free. The radio market in northern Benin allows us to use a novel strategy to control for these factors. In particular, many small radio stations with limited signal strength dominate the media market, each carrying similar programming that is likely to influence household demand for bed nets. Because the stations are small, dispersed and numerous, villages that are close to each other and not separated by any remarkable topographical features can nevertheless exhibit significant differences in access. Short distances and small changes in elevation are enough to degrade the signal received by some of them. These differences are unlikely to affect bed net distribution except through their influence on radio access.
Previous research has also relied on geology for identification purposes, but these have been significant topographical features sufficient to obstruct broadcasts from one or a few large stations (Strömberg, 2004; Olken, 2009; and Yanagizawa, 2009) . To the extent that the topographical differences between communities with more and less access to these few large stations are significant, it could be the case that they have a direct effect on communities, undermining the exclusion assumption.
The topographical features that yield variation in access to radio signals across villages in our sample are exogenous. However, it is possible that the location of community radio stations is not and is related to unobserved characteristics of the villages that receive them. The histories of individual radio stations, our purposive selection of the village sample and the use of commune fixed effects substantially mitigate these concerns.
Most of the small community radio stations were established through the support of donors and governments. They cared about reaching remote and rural areas but were otherwise indifferent to radio location. By themselves, these selection criteria would be ideal for our purposes. However, investigating team post-code the response for type of radio. We did not directly prompt the household to categorize what type of radio they like listening to. donors needed local partners to establish the stations. Idiosyncratic conditions within communes affected which communes yielded such partners. Moreover, Ahokpossi (2009) argues that potential radio entrants in Benin viewed the commune as their relevant market and took commune-specific characteristics into account in deciding whether they would locate. Commune-specific characteristics, related to economic conditions and political struggles within a commune, therefore ultimately affected where radios were established.
Gratz (1999) details the history of one of these community radios, Radio Tanguieta located in Tanguieta commune in Atacora department. Local politicians controlled the community radio and Gratz reports concerns about embezzlement and over-spending on salaries of numerous radio announcers representing different ethnic groups. Unobserved, commune characteristics evidently subject community radio projects to the same political risks of local elite capture and clientelist and ethnic politics as community-based projects in other sectors.
Since unobserved commune characteristics could plausibly affect education outcomes, we do not exploit inter-commune differences in community radio access to identify radio effects on patterns of bed net distribution. Instead, all estimates control for commune fixed effects and identify the influence of community radio based solely on intra-commune variation in radio access.
Unobserved village characteristics might also inject bias into our estimates. Cultural and economic characteristics of villages may lead some villages to enjoy both more access to withincommune community radios and to receive more free bed nets. To address this concern, we used maps showing the location of villages, radio towers, and major road networks to restrict the sample frame to 210 villages that were approximately equidistant to (equally remote from) radio towers and roads inside the commune. 12 In any case, though, most of the variation in access to radio signals is explained by differences in access to out-of-commune radio stations. The average household has access to .63 within-commune community radio stations, with a standard deviation of .51. It has access to 1.78 out-of-commune stations, with a standard deviation of 1.45. Within communes, some villages receive signals from out-of-commune stations that other, similarly located villages, do not. These differences in access are exogenous, since community radio stations focus only on the villages within their commune.
The differences in radio access across villages within a commune are not a function of their remoteness from radio transmitters, but rather of the small and therefore, we argue, exogenous geologic differences that disrupt their ability to receive the signals of these lowpowered station.
This, however, does not attenuate the ability of our tests to pick up the traditional accountability story in the literature: those households with more access to out-of-commune stations are better-informed about the existence of bed net distribution programs, the pricing of bed nets and the need for bed nets, all critical ingredients in accountability. Out-of-commune stations do not inform them about the compliance of their local officials with centrally-mandated rules regarding pricing, but their personal observation of local official behavior makes this irrelevant. Note: The columns report OLS estimates of the association of measurable village characteristics with the number or share of community radio stations to which villages have access, controlling for commune fixed effects.
If radio access is the product of exogenous factors and if the sampling strategy was successful, villages with more and less community radio access within a commune should be indistinguishable. In particular, if observable characteristics of villages do not differ systematically, unobservable village characteristics that could cause a spurious relationship between radio access and bed-nets distribution are also likely to be the same in villages with more and less radio access. In fact, Table 2 shows that radio access is uncorrelated with a wide range of observable village characteristics.
The village survey includes data on village distance from urban centers and to a train or bus stop; smaller and more remote villages could both be likely to have fewer accessible radio signals and lower investments in health. The most recent census in Benin, from 2002, has information on village population for nearly all of the villages in the sample. Poorer villages might have unobserved characteristics that affect both radio access and be targeted by the government for bed-nets distribution. Though there is no census or statistically representative data of incomes and economic conditions at the village-level in Benin, the surveys offer several proxies for village incomes. Most are based on village averages of responses to the household survey: the percentage of households that report their income as belonging to the lowest of the income brackets; the percentages of sampled households that report owning a mobile phone and a television; the percentage of households surveyed with brick walls; and the percentage with houses with more than five rooms. With 20 observations per village, these averages are only precise enough to test whether larger income differences separate villages with more and less radio access. From the village surveys, it is also possible to compare villages according to the number of private schools serving the village.
Finally, village linguistic characteristics could be related both to which radio markets the village is in and either to cultural norms that influence health practices or to the ability of the village to attract government programs. Based on the household survey, it is possible to compare villages according to two measures of linguistic diversity that are relevant to these concerns. The first is the probability that any two of these households speak the same language at home. The second is an indicator variable for whether the most common language among the sample of 20 households in a village is different from the most common language among all the households surveyed in the commune in which that village resides. Table 2 reveals no statistically significant association between any of these variables and either the number of community radios to which villages have access or the share of community radios as a fraction of all radios to which a village has access. The variable closest to significance is the distance of a village from the nearest urban center, in the first column, but its effects are small. A one standard deviation increase in distance (18.7 kilometers) is associated with access to approximately 0.11 fewer radio stations. Brick walls are more common in villages with a larger share of community radios, but the effect is not quite significant and, again, its magnitude is small. A one standard deviation in the fraction of households with brick walls (19 percent) is associated with only a three percent greater share of community radios. No measures of income, wealth, remoteness or linguistic diversity are significant. There is, then, no evidence that villages with access to more community radio are significantly different in other ways from villages with less access. Table 3 reports the bivariate correlations between radio access and each of the variables. In nearly all cases, observable village characteristics are not significantly correlated with community radio access. This time, the correlation between village radio access and distance to an urban center is statistically significant, but the magnitude is small: a one standard deviation increase in distance (18.7 kilometers) is associated with access to .19 fewer stations (less than .20 of a standard deviation). This observed heterogeneity has no impact on our results. Among the 75 percent of villages that are no more than 32 kilometers from the nearest urban center, the correlation disappears. The results reported below are robust to looking only at this smaller sample of villages.
The fraction of households reporting incomes of less than 30,000 CFA francs is also marginally significantly correlated with community radio access. A one standard deviation increase in this fraction (.21) is associated with access to .12 fewer community radio stations, less than 10 percent of the standard deviation of community radio access. Again, however, these differences have no effect on the results. The correlation disappears among the 75 percent of villages where fewer than 53 percent of villages report low incomes and the results reported below are robust to looking only at this subsample. In sum, the fragmentation of the Benin radio market and a sampling procedure that exploits variation in access to out-of-commune community radio stations allow us to include more homogeneous villages than has been possible in previous research. Most studies of media impact are based on variation across jurisdictions or households in their access to the same large broadcasting or publishing outlets. In contrast, the analysis here is based on within-commune variation in village access to small community radio stations. Unobserved differences between commune villages that can access out-of-commune radio broadcasts and those that cannot are likely to be insignificant compared to the differences between villages that can access centrally-broadcast media and those that cannot.
Village-level variation in radio access and bed-nets distribution
The impact of radio on government responsiveness and household behavior is tested with regressions specified according to (1):
where the dependent variable is, in turn, the total number bed nets (from all sources), the number of free, government-provided bed nets, and the number of paid government bed nets. The units of observation are household i in village j and commune k; is a commune fixed effect. If access to media increases government responsiveness and household demand for bed nets, 1 > 0 for all three bed net variables. If higher demand for bed nets only leads local officials to sell bed nets that they could otherwise distribute for free, 1 > 0 for paid government bed nets, but is equal to or less than zero for free government bed nets; and it is not significantly different from zero for total bed nets.
In addition to commune fixed effects, the control variables include the number of children in the household and the number of children five years of age or younger, and the number of adults and the number of adults over 60. Malaria poses the greatest dangers for young children and pregnant women, and anti-malaria campaigns tend to encourage households to protect these populations. The 2007 bed net campaign in Benin specifically targeted young children, five and under. The results below provide no evidence, however, of successful targeting of this group.
The number of bed nets owned by a household, both through government donations and own-purchase, is significantly correlated with the total number of household residents, adults and children. Controlling for the total numbers of children and adults, it is not correlated with the number of children reported as younger than five. This could be because our sample size of households is not sufficiently large to detect such targeting, or because of measurement error in members' ages, especially around the cut-off of 5 years. The first caveat is unlikely, since 2,190 households report children under five, or more than 56 percent of the sample on which our estimates are based.
The estimates take into account respondent education, since better-educated households are more likely to understand the importance of bed nets. The regressions also control for a number of dichotomous ethnicity and religion variables, in case particular ethnic or religious groups are better mobilized to take advantage of government services or, in contrast, more likely to be excluded from it. Controls also include a variety of measures of household income (quality of housing construction, cash income levels reported by the household and ownership of mobile phones or a television); the marital status of the household head (including single or polygamous), and the gender and age of both the respondent and household head. The television and mobile phone variables also serve to control for alternative sources of information that might be available to the household.
Finally, the base specifications take into account a number of village characteristics. The education of the village chief should influence both household demand for bed nets as well as the attention that villages receive from government distribution authorities. The distance of the village from the nearest urban center and from the nearest bus stop or train station, as well as the presence of paved roads that service the village, affect the costs of distributing bed nets. The presence of functional private schools captures differences across villages in the demand for social services, while the presence of a secondary school, literacy center or a health or maternity center control for differences across villages in their capacity to attract government resources.
The base specifications all use the number of bed nets rather than whether households have at least one bed net. Although 86 percent of households have at least one net, variation among those households in the number of nets is large: on average, those with any bed nets have 2.2 bed nets, but 30 percent have only one and another 30 percent have at least three. This variation is key, since the number of bed nets in a household determines the actual protection against malaria that household members receive. However, it is possible that radio access should affect whether households have any bed nets at all, rather than the number that they have. This might be the case if nets are rationed and income constraints are severe. In robustness checks that we report, radio access also has a significant effect on whether households report any paid bed nets procured from government.
Another key objective in anti-malaria campaigns focusing on bed nets is to encourage households to use bed nets pre-treated with insecticide, which provide substantially greater protection at low additional cost (Dupas, 2009) . The estimates below separately analyze all household bed nets and only bed nets reported by households to be pre-treated. The average household reports 1.9 total bed nets of which 1.6, on average, are pre-treated; it reports 1.2 government bed nets (paid or free) of which, on average, 1.1 are pre-treated. Households report, on average, .24 paid, treated government bed nets. In both cases, we ask whether radio access affects the quantity of nets received free or for a price. Table 4 reports six estimates of equation (1). The first looks at the effect of radio access on the total number of bed nets reported by households; the second focuses only on free, governmentprovided bed nets; and the third examines only the number of government bed nets that the households paid for (did not receive for free). Columns four through six repeat the analysis, but focus only on bed nets pre-treated with insecticide. All specifications contain the same control variables, including commune fixed effects, and are estimated using ordinary least squares. The first row of Table 4 reports the effects of access to non-commercial private (community) radio.
Taken together, the community radio coefficients across the six specifications support the hypothesis that radio access increases both demand for bed nets and a particular supply responsethe diversion of free bed nets to the paid market by local officials. Columns 1 and 4 indicate that radio access has no significant influence on the total number of bed nets in the household. This is the result we would expect given the dominance of the national government in the supply of bed nets and the lack of national government responsiveness to citizens informed by community radio broadcasts. The second and fourth specifications show that more community radio access does not increase household access to free government bed nets, treated or otherwise. On the contrary, the coefficients are negative and large, though not statistically significant. The third and sixth specifications show that households with greater community radio access report more paid government bed nets. 13 13 These results are unchanged when the paid government bed net variable is replaced with all bed nets purchased by households, including from non-government sources. However, there is no effect of radio on nets reported to be purchased from the private sector alone. This is not surprising given that government channels dominate the bed nets market in Benin. Note: All specifications estimated with ordinary least squares, with commune fixed effects. Robust p-values, with standard errors clustered at the village level, reported in parentheses. Coefficient estimates of the following controls are insignificant and not reported: ethnic dummies (Adja, Fon, Bariba, Dendi, Yoa/Lokpa, Peulh, Goua/Otamari, Yoruba); age and gender of household head; and whether the respondent is Islamic. The following village controls are insignificant and not reported: whether the village chief has a primary education; whether a paved road serves the village; the distance to the closest urban center; the number of functional private schools; and the presence of a secondary school.
These effects are substantively large when compared to other influences on bed net acquisition. Respondents who completed their elementary education did not have significantly more paid bed nets; the estimated effect of secondary education is a fraction of the effect of community radio. A one standard deviation increase in community radio access (1.5 stations) is associated with .08 additional paid government bed nets (columns three or six). This effect is comparable to that of secondary education: households where the respondent had completed secondary education had .12 more bed nets than households with only primary education. It is also comparable to income effects. The richest households, those reporting incomes over 44,000 CFA francs and cement floors, had approximately .21 more bed nets than households reporting incomes less than 27,500 CFA and no cement floors. Table 4 results indicate that targeting effects are weak, so strict adherence to a targeting regime is unlikely to explain the lack of media effects on the receipt of free government bed nets. One formal criterion used by the government is that every 1.8 persons in a household are entitled to one bed net. Every additional person should therefore yield at last one-half of an additional free government bed net. Instead, column 2 indicates that every additional adult yields .16 and every additional child .11 additional free bed nets. Experts also advise that children under five are the most vulnerable and should receive nets first. However, the coefficient on the number of children under five is not significant, though the results in Table 4 do not address who actually sleeps under the bed nets reported by households.
The educated have more bed nets than the uneducated and the effect rises with the level of education: those who completed their elementary education have .09 more bed nets than those who did not; those who completed high school have .27 more; and those who completed higher education have .56 additional nets (column one). For secondary and higher education, the correlation operates most strongly on the acquisition of paid bed nets. However, those with only elementary education are more likely to have a greater number of free bed-nets, and no significant correlation with paid bed nets. Households in villages with chiefs who have completed secondary education also report more total bed nets.
Policy Knowledge and Media
Table 4 makes clear that the pathway from media access to greater bed net acquisition is unlikely to run through national government responsiveness, since access has no effect on the total number of bed nets and does not increase the number of free bed nets reported by households. Instead, household behavior appears to change as a result of exposure to radio programs on malaria and malaria prevention, which increase household willingness to pay for bed nets. To examine the responsiveness and behavioral mechanisms linking radio access to bed net acquisition, this section estimates the impact of radio access on citizen knowledge of facts related to government responsiveness and the benefits of good health practices.
We can estimate the effect of radio access on these two types of knowledge using equation (1), substituting knowledge variables for the bed net dependent variables, as in equation (2).
With one exception, all of the control variables are the same as in Table 4 . Visits by health workers to discuss malaria might be important sources of knowledge; these are therefore controlled for, in addition, in all specifications of equation (2). 14 Radio access may fail to influence government responsiveness for three reasons. One is that the relevant information is already common knowledge. The second is that, in an environment where citizens can do little to influence government responsiveness, radio stations have little incentive to broadcast information about government performance. Third, stations broadcast the information, but because citizens cannot act on it, it has no effect on government actions. Only one question in the survey, "What is the government doing to fight malaria?", relates specifically to household knowledge of government bed net policies. It supports the first explanation for the failure of radio access to increase the supply of free bed nets, since nearly all respondents (93 percent) replied, without prompting, that the government distributed free malaria nets. This number is far higher than the 69 percent who actually received a bed net and the 67 percent who were able to receive more than one community radio station. Not surprisingly, the first column in Table 5 shows that the estimated effects of community radio access on knowledge of government bed net campaigns is positive, but insignificant.
However, the ability of households to increase government responsiveness also depends on whether they know which government officials are responsible for supplying free bed nets. The survey does not ask directly about this. However, it contains other questions that probe household knowledge of government health commitments and the agencies responsible for fulfilling them: Can respondents identify the agency responsible for managing government health centers (COGECS)? Do they know the national health policy on providing one health center per arrondissement? And do they know that the fees charged by health centers are supposed to be fixed by the national government? The effects of radio access are entirely insignificant for the first two and only borderline significant for the third. In contrast, there is a significant positive 14 Health worker visits could themselves be the product of radio access and so are not controlled for in our main regressions of community radio access on bed nets. In fact, all of the results in Table 4 are robust to controlling for health worker visits and all of the results in this section are robust to omitting health worker visits. correlation of such policy knowledge with whether a health worker has visited the household. 15 In contrast, radio broadcasts do increase household knowledge of the importance of good health practices. The survey asked whether respondents knew that the use of oral rehydration salts (ORS) is the proper treatment for diarrhea in young children. This is consistent with the earlier argument: in an environment in which citizens cannot act on such knowledge, radio stations may not broadcast the information or respondents may not pay attention to it, attenuating links between relevant knowledge and radio access. Keefer and Khemani (2010) , for example, show that radio access has no effect on government inputs into schools and, correspondingly, no effect on respondent knowledge of government education policies.
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These effects, however, are entirely conditional on access to radio. The third column reports results from interacting the radio access variable with the gender of the respondent and the number of children in the household. Female respondents with no access to radio are no more likely to know about ORS treatment; nor are households with children. However, among respondents in which the household respondent is female and the household has the median number of children (two), an increase in the number of community radio stations from zero to the median (two) leads to a 4.4 percentage point increase in the fraction of respondents who respond correctly to the ORS question; 48 percent of all respondents answered this question correctly.
Fifty percent answered correctly. The second column in Table 5 shows that radio access has no effect on ORS knowledge, but this is misleading. The effects of radio on ORS knowledge should matter most for respondents who are most likely to need that knowledge: women with children in the house. Consistent with this, female respondents and the number of children in the household are strongly correlated with knowledge of ORS -larger than all other variables with the exception of education.
Another survey question, which is likely to be correlated with household knowledge of good health practices, asks respondents to give a ball-park estimate of child mortality rates in Beninaround how many among any 100 children born in Benin would not survive beyond the age of five? Greater knowledge of child mortality rates may be especially correlated with health messages related to malaria and the efficacy of bed-nets, given that this disease is one of the leading causes of death among children before they reach their fifth birthday. Only 15 percent of respondents correctly answered with the right range (based on national statistics). The last column in Table 5 shows that village radio access has a significant positive effect on correctly identifying the range of child mortality rates in Benin. These results are consistent with media effects on household knowledge of health practices and outcomes, which would account for the estimated reduced-form effect of media access on household private investment in anti-malaria bed nets. Table 4 , plus control for health worker visit for malaria discussion. The third column also controls for the indicated interaction terms. Health worker visit and other coefficients not reported; among them, only the income and wealth variables are generally positively and significantly associated with knowledge of ORS.
Robustness
The results in Table 4 are robust to a large number of other specifications. The estimates are based on household observations. They are clustered and therefore not assumed to have independently-distributed errors at the village level. However, since bed net distribution could be focused on villages, and radio access varies by village, the village could be the more appropriate unit of observation. Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (1) at the village level. The survey includes information on village level characteristics that might affect the availability of bed nets, in addition to radio access: the distance of the village to the nearest urban center or to the nearest bus or train stop; the number of new potable water sources in the village and whether the village has a paved road; the number of functional private schools; whether the village has access to a literacy center of health/maternity center; the level of education of the village chief. All of these are controlled for. The village population comes from census data. Unfortunately, the census has no income data at the village level. We therefore average village responses to the income and housing quality questions and control for these averages. Finally, in a linguistically diverse country, linguistic heterogeneity could affect access to bed nets. We control for two variables, again based on household responses to the survey: whether the main village language and the main commune language are the same; and the probability that any two households in the village sample speak the same language.
The estimates in Table 6 reinforce the results presented in Table 4 : radio access increases both the willingness of households to pay for bed nets and the diversion of potentially free bed nets into the paid market. As before, access to community radio has no significant effect on the total number of bed nets and a negative, insignificant effect on the number of free bed nets reported by households. In contrast, again as in the earlier estimates, radio access leads households to acquire a significantly larger number of paid government bed nets.
Proximity to a bus stop has a significant positive association with the number of treated government bed nets in the village, consistent with the possibility that government efforts to disseminate bed nets are sensitive to the cost of reaching those households. The presence of a literacy center, but not a health center, is associated with more treated government nets, but with no other kind of net. Results from the fourth specification indicate that villages that lack private schools and are further from urban centers are less likely to acquire untreated government nets. 2007-08; primary education of village chief; average number of respondents who report income less than 27.5 thousand CFA francs; mean no. of respondents who report cement floors; mean no. of respondents with mobile phones; whether most common language is the same in village and commune; the probability that any two households speak the same language in the home; average number of adults over 60; and the average number of children under five. Table 7 summarizes the results of a number of other robustness tests. First, radio access should influence not only the number, but also the share of government and own-acquired bed nets. The first row of Table 7 shows that results are robust to substituting the share of different categories of bed nets for the absolute numbers, as in Table 4 . Radio continues to have a significant positive impact on the share of own-acquired bed nets, treated or not (the effect on the share of government bed nets is, by construction, the negative of this). It is also possible that the effects of radio access should be properly viewed as influencing whether households acquire any bed nets at all. Results are unchanged after substituting dichotomous variables for the number of bed nets, as in Table 4 , and using a logit specification with commune fixed effects (results not reported).
The identification strategy of the paper ensures that variations in radio access are exogenous, but this may not be the case for other independent variables in the specification in Table 4 , potentially injecting bias into all of the estimated coefficients. The second row of Table 4 presents the results of regressions that control only for the (exogenous) radio variables and commune fixed effects. The estimated effects of private non-commercial radio on own-acquired bed nets are larger; government-sourced bed nets continue to be insignificantly or negatively influenced by radio access.
A key part of public health policy in Benin, as in other poor countries, is outreach by health workers. We check that our results are robust to including outreach visits by health workers, which could be independently correlated with radio access or with underlying household demand. 17 The estimates in Table 4 ignore the possible interdependence of demand for government and own-investment in bed nets. The fourth and fifth rows of Table 7 present results of specifications that take these effects into account. The fourth row takes a naïve approach to this issue and looks only at the sub-sample of households that should have the strongest demand for own investments in bed nets -those who receive no free government bed nets at all. The magnitude of the effect of community radio access is larger here than in Table 4 , as one would expect. An alternative approach, controlling for the number of government bed nets in the ownacquired bed net specification, yields the same result: the more free government bed nets a household has, the fewer bed nets it acquires using own resources (every additional government bed net is associated with .21 fewer non-government bed nets).
The survey asked respondents if they had received a visit by a health worker to discuss malaria prevention. These visits are common: 41 percent of respondents report that a health worker called on their household. The third row of Table 8 reports estimates of radio access based on the Table 4 specification, supplemented with a dichotomous variable indicating whether households received such a visit. Controlling for these outreach visits has no effect on the estimated effects of radio access on bed net acquisition.
The fifth row explicitly allows for the possibility that unobserved household characteristics simultaneously influence household access to free government nets and private investments in bed nets. Seemingly-unrelated regressions (SUR) correct for this possibility, allowing for the error terms across the government and own-acquired bed nets regressions to be correlated. Estimating equation (1) using SUR again yields a significant effect of access to community radio on the acquisition of bed nets using own resources. Note: Each coefficient is the estimated effect of the number of community radios on the indicated dependent variable, from the corresponding specification of Table 4 , as modified according to the indication in the first column above. In the last two rows, the number of community radio stations in the specification of Table 4 is replaced with two variables: the number of stations broadcasting from inside the commune and the number from outside. Both coefficients from the corresponding regression are reported.
The next three rows look at sub-samples that are more homogeneous with regard to remoteness. The sixth row examines only villages that lack a paved road. The seventh excludes the 25 percent of the sample that is nearest to a bus stop and the eighth excludes the 25 percent that is furthest away. Again, the results mimic those in Table 4 ; access to non-commercial private radio has a strong, positive effect on the number of own-acquired bed nets that households report.
The specifications in Table 4 include all community radios to which villages have access, both within and outside their commune. Given the small size of community radio stations and the way in which the sample of villages was selected, village access to both types of radio stations is likely to be exogenous. The arguments underlying identification are strongest, however, for withincommune variation in village access to out of-commune radio stations. An important robustness issue is therefore whether the main results of the paper -the lack of effect of radio access on the number of free bed nets and the positive effect on the number of paid government bed nets -are robust to looking at within-and out-of-commune stations separately. The last two rows of Table 7 therefore examine a specification in which the number of out-of-commune and of within-commune stations replace the single community radio variable in the Table 4 specification. As in Table 4 , access to out-of-commune stations has a highly significant positive effect on the number of paid government bed nets households report and no effect on the number of free bed nets; coefficient magnitudes are about the same as those in Table 4 .
Many of the robustness specifications yield a significant negative estimate of the effect of radio access on the number of free bed nets that households report, consistent with the argument that the diversion of free bed nets to paid markets is higher where demand is greater. Consistent with this argument, the effect is most marked for within-commune community radio stations in the last two rows of Table 7 .
Conclusion
Previous studies in the literature on the role of media and information in government accountability show a strong relationship in mature democracies between access to media and to government-provided benefits. In contrast, based on a novel policy and institutional context, and using a new identification strategy, our results demonstrate for the first time that media access may not affect benefits received by households, but rather, may enable local government agents to exploit greater household willingness to pay for the benefits. This government response is consistent with the outcomes we would expect in a political environment, such as that in Benin, in which administrative controls are weak and government benefits are preferentially targeted to those with stronger links to clientelist networks rather than to those with general access to information.
An additional contribution of this study is to increase our understanding of the mechanisms through which media access influences policy outcomes. All theories agree that media access matters because it increases the transmission of relevant information to households, better enabling them to hold government accountable or to make appropriate decisions regarding health, education or simply the take-up of government policies. With the exception of research by Snyder and Strömberg (2011) using US data, earlier researchers could not confirm both that media actually broadcast relevant information and that media affected respondent knowledge. The data from Benin fill both of these gaps.
They confirm that radios do broadcast information on health and, specifically, malaria. Moreover, these broadcasts are relevant both for accountability (the existence and timing of free bed net distribution) and household behavior (the importance of using bed nets). Nevertheless, consistent with the reduced-form estimations showing that radio access increases household willingness to pay for government bed nets, radio access also has significant effects on knowledge relevant for private health practices; it has no significant effect on knowledge relevant for government accountability, namely, government health policies.
The data do not allow for an evaluation of the welfare consequences of the diversion of bed nets to the paid market. First, they do not reveal whether local officials use bed net payments to subsidize other health interventions provided by health centers, or for private purposes. Second, they do not indicate whether households that pay for bed nets are more or less vulnerable to malaria compared to households that would have received the bed nets for free. Third, we cannot measure the effects of media on how households utilize the nets -better utilization may offset any welfare losses due to the effects of pricing on how bed nets are distributed across households.
The literature reviewed earlier yields mixed evidence on whether the shift from free to paid bed nets and other health products increases their appropriate use by households most in need of them. The diversion of free bed nets to the paid market may therefore have no significant impact on how they are used nor on who uses them. If this is the case, the results here suggest that the main impact of media coverage of malaria and malaria prevention may be to reduce the consumer surplus of households while either increasing the welfare of households that receive health care subsidized by bed net payments or increasing the welfare of local officials who retain the payments received from the sale of bed nets that they would otherwise have had to distribute for free.
Our analysis examines only the effects of media access and does not test the efficacy of concerted efforts to broadcast programming that encourages citizens to increase government responsiveness. Evidence from Brazil suggests that greater access to radio played a facilitating role in reducing local government corruption during a campaign of public disclosure of audit findings of irregularities in municipal government spending (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) ). Tendler (1997) describes how a reform-minded state governor in Brazil successfully used radio broadcasts to spread messages that undercut municipal patronage politics and increased citizen demand for municipal public health services. More recently, and specifically for Benin, Wantchekon (2009) examines how more deliberately designed information campaigns might change clientelist political incentives. An open question for future research on accountability interventions in more clientelist democracies is, therefore, whether accountability programming can be tailored to local political contexts to strengthen political incentives for service delivery.
